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Abstract
Whether and to what extent Keynes should be considered both a liberal and an individualist is a rather
complex  question,  and  one  which  this  paper  proposes  to  disentangle  by  analyzing  Keynes'
understanding of Mandeville, whose positions on these two issues were rather ambiguous, as well.
Through a comparison of Keynes' reading of the Fable of the Bees with those of N. Rosenberg, F.
Hayek and L. Dumont, it is shown that Mandeville' s and Keynes' positions are much more alike than is
generally admitted. Furthermore, this similarity invites us to redefine such categories as « individualism
», « holism », « liberalism » and « interventionism », which clearly are difficult to apply to either of these
two authors.
Résumé
Dans le but d'éclairer la question de savoir jusqu'à quel point Keynes devrait être considéré tant
comme un libéral que comme un individualiste, le texte examine la façon dont Keynes a compris
Mandeville qui, adoptait lui-même, à ce double égard, des positions plutôt ambiguës. La lecture que
fait Keynes de la Fable des Abeilles est comparée à celles de N. Rosenberg, de F. Hayek et de L.
Dumont. De cette comparaison, se dégage la conclusion que les positions respectives de Keynes et de
Mandeville  sont  beaucoup  plus  apparentées  qu'on  le  suppose  généralement.  De  plus,  ce
rapprochement nous invite à redéfinir des concepts comme "individualisme", "holisme", "libéralisme" et
"interventionnisme" qui manifestement ne peuvent s'appliquer aisément ni à l'un ni à l'autre de ces
auteurs.
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Abstract : Whether and to what extent Keynes should be considered both a 
liberal and an individualist is a rather complex question, and one which this 
paper proposes to disentangle by analyzing Keynes' understanding of 
Mandeville, whose positions on these two issues were rather ambiguous, as 
well. Through a comparison of Keynes' reading of the Fable of the Bees 
with those of N. Rosenberg, F. Hayek and L. Dumont, it is shown that 
Mandeville' s and Keynes' positions are much more alike than is generally 
admitted. Furthermore, this similarity invites us to redefine such categories 
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as « individualism », « holism », « liberalism » and « interventionism », 
which clearly are difficult to apply to either of these two authors. 
Classification JEL : B110, B220, B400 
It seems fair to say that John Maynard Keynes' intellectual and moral 
personality was anything but straightforward1. Any attempts to locate him 
in the spectrum which goes from socialism to liberalism or to characterize 
him either as a holist or as an individualist are doomed to failure. It is true 
that Keynes devoted a short article to the characterization of his relation to 
liberalism. But « Am I a Liberal ? » concerns essentially his adherence to 
the Liberal party rather than any commitment to the tenets of economic 
liberalism. A more significant piece of evidence, however, would be « The 
End of the Laissez-faire », another essay of the same period, where he 
clearly establishes that he is not a liberal in the sense in which this word is 
usually used by economists. After all, the unequivocal denial of the alleged 
virtue of laissez-faire which constitutes the core of this essay is in keeping 
with the main theses that Keynes was to develop later in The General 
Theory. On the other hand, Keynes' commitment to free trade and 
capitalism and the key-role he gave, even as an economist, to the principles 
of political liberalism make the matter a little more ambiguous. For Keynes, 
liberalism is clearly not reducible to laissez-faire and The General Theory 
itself is, in his mind, a way to save liberalism much more than a way to 
destroy it. Not only does he present his book, in his famous letter to 
Bernard Shaw, as a tool to « knock away » the « Ricardian foundations of 
Marxism », but he says more explicitly that « the result of filling in the gaps 
in the classical theory is not to dispose of the "Manchester system", but to 
indicate the nature of the environment which the free play of economic 
forces requires if it is to realise the full potentialities of production » 
(Keynes 1936, p. 379). It seems that the point for him was to redesign the 
framework that Adam Smith had carefully but incompletely defined for the 
proper working of the free market. At any rate, if Keynes was an 
interventionist, it was surely not because he had high confidence in the 
wisdom of the political leaders. On the contrary, he condemns the rigidity 
with which the Gold Standard had been imposed by them in such a way that 
it had literally choked the market which, according to him, needed much 
more room to operate properly. Rather than forcing the consumers and 
entrepreneurs in a State controlled jacket, the Government should play a 
1 . The author would like to thank Bradley Bateman, Gilles Dostaler and Bruce Toombs for 
their useful comments and the SSHRC (Ottawa) and the Fonds FCAR (Quebec) for financial 
assistance. 
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compensating role in the market, spending when consumers and 
entrepreneurs are too frightened to spend enough and saving when they 
tend to overspend. In such a context the money motive might continue to 
be the main force which governs the economy. I do not say that Keynes is a 
liberal, but I do say that his position is rather ambiguous. 
As for his position between individualism and holism, the situation is 
very similar. His rejection of laissez-faire was closely associated with the 
fact that he had poor confidence in the capacities of individuals. More 
often, said Keynes, « individuals acting separately to promote their own 
ends, are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these. » (Keynes 1931, p. 
312) The very way he was later to defend an anti-reductionist stand against 
traditional microeconomics based on an analysis of individual choice also 
suggests that he cannot be considered an individualist. In The General 
Theory, his rebuttal of any attempt to explain a macroeconomic 
phenomenon by aggregating the result of individual actions seems to be a 
direct rebuttal of methodological individualism. Insisting on the fact that 
workers cannot have the least control over their real wages, which would 
rather be determined by general inflationary forces, seems indeed to 
contradict many decades of efforts by economists to show that such social 
forces are nothing but a complex result of human decisions. But, to say 
nothing about the colorful dimensions of his strongly individualistic 
personality, it is far from clear that Keynes was rejecting individualism. 
After all, the concluding chapter of The General Theory includes a frank 
profession in favor of individualism whose advantages, according to him, 
« will still hold good » in the new framework. Far from encroaching 
individualism by his proposition to enlarge the functions of government, 
Keynes considers that he defends a « condition of the successful 
functioning of individual initiative » (Keynes 1936, p. 380). Even on the 
front of methodological individualism, it would be very misleading to 
consider Keynes as a holist. To come back to the question of the control 
over real wages, Keynes merely wants to point out that if, during a period of 
high unemployment, some unemployed workers agree to work at money 
wages which are lower than the prevailing wages on the market, and if 
eventually such a move progressively, through competition, leads the other 
workers to do the same, there will result a general reduction in money- 
wages. Keynes concludes from this that, to the extent that they are dictated 
by costs, prices will also be significantly affected and that consequently no 
reduction in real wages will take place. For Keynes, this is sufficient for 
invalidating the microeconomic theory according to which an increased 
demand for labor can result from a reduction of wages. But such a theory is 
perfectly compatible with methodological individualism which, according 
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to Hayek, typically leaves ample room for the development of unintended 
consequences of individual decisions. Here again, I do not want to present 
Keynes as a paragon of individualism but rather as a ambiguous figure in 
the debate about individualism. 
However, my point is that this ambiguousness, far from being a purely 
idiosyncratic character of his personality, is largely due to ambiguities in 
the very notions of liberalism and of individualism. To illustrate this point, 
it might be illuminative to compare Keynes with another highly ambiguous 
intellectual figure whose renewed notoriety in XXth century Keynes 
incidentally is partly responsible for, namely Bernard de Mandeville. I will 
not claim that Keynes' interpretation of Mandeville is necessarily valid. I 
would rather say that Keynes acknowledged a kind of kinship between 
himself and this author. Mandeville' s thought indeed was ambiguous 
enough to be admired by Keynes for its plea in favor of interventionism 
and of anti-reductionism while being later presented by Friedrich Hayek as 
a forerunner of a true liberalism and by Louis Dumont as one of the 
decisive turning points in the development of Western individualism. 
But let us see why Keynes was so enthusiastic about Mandeville. The 
answer to this question is made easier by the fact that Keynes quotes two 
passages2 that he presents as the « theoretical basis » (Keynes 1936, p. 361) 
of Mandeville' s views on economy. In one of them, Mandeville defends the 
idea that Government should promote a great variety of manufactures, arts 
and handicrafts and encourage agriculture and fishery rather than 
regulating lavishness and frugality. Even if this is not as unequivocally pro- 
Keynesian as Keynes would like, it is true, as documented by Jacob Viner 
and by Nathan Rosenberg, that Mandeville was sympathetic to some 
Government intervention, especially in foreign trade, but also in domestic 
affairs, as it seems to be clearly illustrated in the final sentence of A Search 
into the Nature of Society where Mandeville refers to « the dextrous 
management of a skilful Politician » to help turning private vices in public 
benefits3. Thus, it seems fair to say that Keynes found in Mandeville a 
fellow advocate of some government intervention. 
The other passage quoted by Keynes denounces the « error » of 
concluding that, since saving is a wise method to increase a family estate, 
2. Those extracts quoted without references by Keynes are actually drawn from the Remark Q, 
(pp 198 and 215-216 in original pagination; Mandeville 1714, I, pp. 182 and 197-198) 
that Mandeville added to his Fable. 
3. Mandeville 1714, I, p. 369; see also II, p. 319; quoted by Rosenberg 1963, p. 188 and 
192. 
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one should conclude that frugality is wise as well when « a whole nation » is 
considered. As we have seen, it is because he constantly denounced this 
type of error that one is tempted to characterize Keynes as a holist, or at 
least as an anti-reductionist, rather than as an individualist. What is true for 
individuals acting at the level of the family is no longer true at the 
macroeconomic level. It is interesting to note that Keynes contrasted 
Mande ville' s position with a sentence in which Adam Smith suggests that 
what is good in the conduct of a private family is surely good as well in the 
conduct of a great kingdom, a sentence which, curiously enough, is almost 
word for word the principle from which Thomas Mun4 had drawn his 
typically mercantilistic doctrine of the importance of maintaining a 
favorable balance of trade. Thus, against those like Mun and Smith who 
tended to treat whole nations like individual estates, Mandeville and Keynes 
were fully aware of the fact generally associated to holism, that what is true 
for individual components is not necessarily true for the whole. 
But for Keynes, there was still more to be found in Mandeville. As is 
well known, the view of Mandeville which was, more than any other, 
highlighted by Keynes was his promotion of sumptuary, luxurious and 
« vicious » consumption as a way to stimulate economic activity for the 
greatest public benefit. In the context of the great Depression where saving 
was seen by many as the greatest virtue, Mandeville' s paradoxical 
statements was for Keynes a colorful way to outer his own paradoxical 
views. Moreover, the complicity between Mandeville and Keynes goes 
further. The Fable of the Bees was the source of an intense debate all along 
the XVIIIth century because Mandeville' s crude realism hurt the moral 
convictions of most of his contemporaries. The very idea that vices could 
have beneficial effects was difficult to integrate in a moral system whether 
this system be based on a religious or on a rationalist foundation. 
Underscoring that vice is the necessary means for a society to become rich 
and successful was hardly distinguishable from defending the primacy of 
wealth over virtue. Mandeville, however, did not accept the condemnation 
of those who treated him as an immoralist. He insistently claimed that he 
was subjectively committed to virtue while objectively noting that collective 
wealth is not possible without private vice. Thus, in the concluding lines of 
his 1714 Preface to the Fable, he exposes his point of view with the help of 
an interesting metaphor : 
But if, without any regard to the Interest or Happiness of the City, the 
Question was put, What Place I thought most pleasant to walk in ? No 
body can doubt but, before the stinking Streets of London, I would 
4. Mun, Thomas, "England's "Treasure by Forraign Trade" in Monroe 1924, p. 171. 
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esteem a fragrant Garden, or a shady Grove in the Country. In the same 
manner, if laying aside all worldly Greatness and Vain-Glory, I should 
be ask'd where I thought it was most probable that Men might enjoy 
true Happiness, I would prefer a small peaceable Society, in which Men, 
neither envy'd nor esteem' d by Neighbours, should be contented to 
live upon the Natural Product of the Spot they inhabit, to a vast 
Multitude abounding in Wealth and Power, that should always be 
conquering others by their Arms Abroad, and debauching themselves 
by Foreign Luxury at Home. (Mandeville, 1714, I, p. 12-13) 
In fact, one may doubt of Mandeville' s sincerity when he insists on the 
preferability of virtue. Moreover, his definitions of virtue and of vice were a 
bit too rigid, as noted by Dr. Samuel Johnson who disliked Mandeville' s 
« monastick » way to associate without qualifications vice with pleasure5. In 
any case, his not very convincing defense of virtue illustrates the 
ambiguousness of his ethical position and explains why the Fable of the 
Bees was so passionately discussed and criticized all along the XVIIIth 
century. 
Mandeville had been relatively forgotten during the XlXth century, but 
his work became anew an object of discussion in the XXth century. Kaye's 
monumental edition of the Fable of the Bees in 1923 and also the attention 
given to the Fable by Keynes in The General Theory were largely 
responsible for a new debate which concerned no longer Mandeville' s 
morality but rather his alleged liberalism and individualism. In spite of 
Mandeville' s commitment to the importance of some government 
intervention and to the irreducibility of the social to the individual ~ a 
commitment which was to be strongly underscored by Keynes, as we have 
seen --, Kaye, in the introduction to his edition, took for granted both that 
« in the Fable Mandeville maintains, and maintains explicitly, the theory at 
present known as the laissez-faire theory" (Mandeville 1714, I, cxxxix) and 
that it is through Mandeville that « individualism becomes an economic 
philosophy » (Mandeville 1714, I, ciii). While somewhat nuanced by Jacob 
Viner and by Nathan Rosenberg, Kaye's interpretation was corroborated by 
two authors who payed particular attention to Mandeville. One of them is 
Friedrich Hayek who, in his 1966 lecture on Dr. Bernard Mandeville, after 
quoting a passage of the Essay on Charity and Charity-schools where 
Mandeville refers to a situation which is « never better kept than when no 
body meddles or interferes with it », concludes that its author was « quite as 
much (or as little) an advocate of laissez-faire as Adam Smith » (Hayek, 
5. Mandeville 1714, II, 436, quoted by Robinson 1962, p. 20. 
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1978, p. 185 quoting Mandeville, 1714, I, pp. 299-300). The other author 
is Louis Dumont who in his 1977 Homo Aequalis characterized the Fable 
as a decisive turning point in the development of Western individualism 
since, by dissociating economic and moral points of views, it made possible 
for the Individual to be freed from social constraints of moral origin 
(Dumont, 1977, pp. 98-101). Incidentally, long before this point was 
systematically analyzed by Dumont, Mandeville' s individualism was 
underscored not only by Kaye, but by Albert Schatz who, in a book 
entitled L'individualisme économique et social published in 1907, 
described the Fable as « l'ouvrage capital où se trouvent tous les germes 
essentiels de la philosophie économique et sociale de l'individualisme » 
(quoted by Hayek, 1978, p. 192, n. 22). 
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that Mandeville was 
involved in flagrant contradictions. To become rich, saving is a wise method 
for an individual but not for a whole nation, but if nations happen to 
become rich, it is because individuals, who do not care for the nation's 
wealth, follow egoistically their « vicious » passions which, for most of them, 
are not oriented towards saving. This accounts for Mandeville' s 
individualism. His liberalism is no more incompatible with his request for 
government intervention. Indeed, the debate about this is largely semantical, 
as shown by Nathan Rosenberg : « the traditional categories of 
interventionism and laissez-faire are inadequate to convey the position of 
someone who wishes the government to intervene in the affairs of the 
domestic economy, but only in order that it may establish a social and legal 
framework within which the interaction of self-seeking egos will result in an 
orderly satisfaction of man's economic needs» (Rosenberg, 1963, p. 189 ; 
see also p. 191). 
But the present paper is not so much about Mandeville as about 
Keynes. My contention is that Keynes' interventionist and anti-reductionist 
attitudes are not more incompatible with his adherence to the Manchester 
system and with his resolute individualism than Mandeville' s similar 
postures. Thus, Keynes' situation might be much more akin to 
Mandeville' s than usually acknowledged. For Keynes, anti-reductionism is 
exemplified by the claim that saving is for individuals but not for nations a 
wise method to become rich as well as by the claim that even if an 
individual worker can reduce his own real wage rate, the whole labor class 
cannot reduce the level of the real wage rate. However, the fact that a nation 
happens to reach such or such a level of wealth or that the labor class 
happens to get such or such real wages, nonetheless results among other 
things from the egoistic propensity to consume or the egoistic supply of 
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labor of a multiplicity of individuals who don't really care about the wealth 
of their nation or about the wage rate of their class. Similarly, Keynes is an 
interventionist of the same brand as Mandeville. To paraphrase Rosenberg, 
he wishes the government to intervene in the affairs of the domestic 
economy, but only in order that it may establish an economic framework 
compatible with full employment within which the interaction of self- 
seeking egos will result in an orderly satisfaction of man's economic needs. 
Clearly, categories like « individualism », « holism », « liberalism » and 
« interventionism » are inadequate to convey the rather ambiguous position 
adopted by Keynes. Keynes shares with Mandeville a realistic and 
pessimistic view of human nature. He is far from being an optimistic 
interventionist fully confident in the rationality of a planning government. 
He is convinced that most people in the modern world are fundamentally 
guided by money motives6 when it is not by more or less « vicious » 
passions, and he concludes that in such a situation the only way to warrant 
material prosperity and the full employment associated with it is to 
encourage and promote consumption, which necessarily includes luxurious 
consumption and consumption of any types of gadgets. But if he was 
asked, like Mandeville was asked by himself, where he « thought it was most 
probable that Men might enjoy true Happiness », he would surely have 
answered that it is in the delectation of art, ideas and other types of 
intellectual fragrant gardens rather than in money and purely material 
satisfactions. But, like Mandeville' s, Keynes' sincerity was doomed to be 
questioned by socialist-oriented interventionists who shared his views about 
true happiness for Humanity while rejecting his somewhat Mandevillian 
cynicism about human nature. It is hardly surprizing that Keynes' thought 
has been as passionately debated in XXth century as Mandeville' s was at 
another level in the XVIIIth century. Both of them force us to redefine 
categories like « individualism », « holism », « liberalism » and 
« interventionism » and to raise on new bases the question of the relations 
between individuals and society. It is true that one should not exaggerate 
the similarities between Keynes and Mandeville, but underscoring their tacit 
complicity may help in grasping a few dimensions of the very complex 
personality of John Maynard Keynes. 
Université de Montréal 
Département de philosophie 
6. See Keynes 1963, p. 320. 
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